Targeted Research - Influence Operations
Targeted Research to Identify and Neutralize Influence Operations
We use iterative results from the targeted collection, creating information and intelligence on influence operations patterns, trends, and tendencies. Treadstone 71 examines data spanning open sources, the darknet, and social media non-inclusively, seeking antagonist information, trigger events, first appearance, and operational activation, vector narratives if there is a permanent and systematic influence campaign, actual manipulation activities, centers of gravity for propaganda, social media provocations, models for misinformation and disinformation messaging, and other active measures.
Iranian Intelligence Services – The Sayad Project and Sayad 2 – Dissident & Foreign Support, Internal Targeting
We:
- Anticipate key target or threat activities that are likely to prompt a leadership decision.
- Aid in coordinating, validating, and managing collection requirements, plans, and activities.
- Monitor and report changes in threat dispositions, activities, tactics, capabilities, objectives as related to designated cyber operations warning problem sets.
- Produce timely, fused, all-source cyber operations intelligence and indications and warnings intelligence products (e.g., threat assessments, briefings, intelligence studies, country studies).
- Provide intelligence analysis and support to designated exercises, planning activities, and time-sensitive operations.
- Develop or recommend analytic approaches or solutions to problems and situations for which information is incomplete or no precedent exists.
- Recognize and mitigate deception in reporting and analysis.
Assess intelligence, recommend targets to support operational objectives. - Assess target vulnerabilities and capabilities to determine a course of action.
- Assist in the development of priority information requirements.
- Enable synchronization of intelligence support plans across the supply chain.
- ...and Review and understand organizational leadership objectives and planning guidance non-inclusively.
Our analysis is evidence-driven seeking strategic motivations and tactical activities that provide a partial, distorted or false view of your organization. We compare against a rich public record of the use of active measures and methods that use disinformation and propaganda as a core tool. This may include perpetual adversarial opposition in the information environment that allows for varied and overlapping approaches. The approaches may reinforce one another when appearing contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the sources of disinformation and propaganda—official government statements, state-funded media outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations,—and the different tactics that these channels use.
We seek false narratives that fine-tune adversary disinformation narratives that suit target audiences, hiding the true source(s) providing plausible deniability for the adversary. Our efforts include examination of media sources with stories that carry potentially dangerous effects at the international, national, and local levels. This may include the weaponization of social media, cultivation of proxy sources, and cyber-enabled disinformation meant to sow chaos, confusion, and create socio-cultural divisions.
Our service includes recommendations for countering the campaigns including active and passive measures.
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